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Autism and the Crisis of Meaning, by Alexander Dung. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1996. 312 pp. $19.95 cloth. ISBN 0-79142814-1.
Barbara Flowers Cottrell
University of California, Riverside
In Autism and the Crisis of Meaning, Dr. Alexander Durig presents a fresh
view not only of autism, but of the nature of meaningful perception itself. He
insists that to better understand autism, we must first come to an
understanding of how humans structure meaning in "normal" situations. This
has long been the goal of many sociologists, particularly symbolic
interactionists, but Durig suggests that these researchers make a fundamental
assumption when they conduct their studies. They assume that meaningful
symbols are what create meaningful perception. He argues that such logic is
conceptually backwards. It is meaningful perception that precedes the use of
meaningful symbols.
We must see that the interpersonal framework depicts the construction of
meaningful symbols, but the apparition and organization of meaningful
perception itself must be seen as preceding or superseding the
construction of symbols themselves .... Meaningful perception itself is a
phenomenon that is neurologically endowed in humans and shaped
specifically through symbolic interaction (p. 35).

In order to understand such "deviant" cases as autism, we must look
behind social symbols and try to explore the order that supports them and
structures their meaning. It is an approach that is reminiscent of Claude LeviStrauss and Roland Barthes, who both argued mat burrowing beneath reality
was the only way of uncovering the underlying logic of reality. Dr. Durig
devotes much of his book to exploring the "deeper" strata of meaningful
perception.
He contends that meaningful perception is built around three basic logical
processes: 1) induction (making general conclusions from specific situations),
2) deduction (making specific conclusions from specific situations) and 3)
abduction (reordering knowledge in the face of new, and often contradictory,
knowledge). The successful integration of all three meaning structures is
necessary if an individual is to be considered a "normal" member of society.
However, he points out that not all people learn (or are able to learn) these
processes as neatly as "normalcy" requires. Some may be more skilled at one
form of logic than another, or may be incapable of mastering one of the three
forms.
Such is the case with people with autism. Whether the cause is
neurological or environmental (there is currently no known explanation for
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autism), Durig argues that autistics lack inductive reasoning capacities. They
are unable to smoothly move from one type of social situation to another
because they are incapable of generalizing knowledge from one situation and
applying it to a new situation. Consequently, new situations are terrifying for
autistics since they have no way of constructing meaning, much less of
maintaining a social self. When confronted with such a self-negating situation,
they are likely to fall back into comforting routines, like rocking back and
forth. It is through this repetitive, ritualized action that the self is rediscovered
and reinforced. Durig's insight seems to be supported by the autobiography of
autistic Donna Williams, Nobody Nowhere. In her book, Williams admits that
patterns and continuity are extremely important to her because "things will
stay the same long enough to grasp an undeniable guaranteed place within the
complex situation around me" (Williams, as quoted in Durig, p. 87).
This lack of "normal" inductive reasoning may also lead to the sharpening
of the other types of logic, much like losing one's sight may enhance the
remaining senses. Durig reiterates the discovery of many researchers, that
some autistics are "savants" who demonstrate incredible intellectual skills. But
he points out that the form these abilities take (numerical calculation, the
ability to build and rebuild objects of extraordinary detail) reflect the autistic's
heavy reliance on deductive reasoning. The fact that only some autistics
possess such "savant" characteristics leads Durig to a second important
insight He insists that autism should not be viewed in binary terms, but as part
of a continuum. While some autistics may have the super-deductive
capabilities that characterize a "savant," others possess ordinary deductive
capabilities which, when coupled by a lack of induction, make them "average"
autistics. This continuum of logical ability also opens up the possibility for
cases of slight autism among people who "pass" as normal in society. The
most fascinating part of Dung's book is bis comparison between "classic"
autistic behavior and the behavior of computer entrepreneur Bill Gates. The
similarity between the two suggests that autism may be much more prevalent
than previously suspected.
The latter part of the book is devoted to a broader discussion of the crisis
of meaning. Durig recounts the history of knowledge and warns social
scientists against the promotion of formal logic to the exclusion of other, more
informal systems of knowledge. Durig argues mat if we persist in this sort of
limited reasoning, we create our own type of autism, which may be very
difficult for us to control. It may also lead to a profound crisis of meaning if it
is challenged by others. But the main utility of Dung's work lies in his reconceptualization of autism. By viewing autism from a fresh perspective, he
aids people who work (and live) with autistics. Durig suggests a number of
ways to help autistics deal with their environment, including the use of
videotapes and computer simulation to prepare them for new situations. By
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using these technologies, autistics can repeat the experience many times, so
that when they actually encounter the situation, they are prepared for it
Very rarely does a book mix important theoretical issues with practical
advice for helping people. Autism and the Crisis of Meaning is such a book.

Law in a Therapeutic Key, edited by David B. Wexler and Bruce J. Winick.
Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1996. 1,012 pp. No price listed.
ISBN 0-89089-988-6.
Sarena W. Mayer, Esq.
Touro College, Jerusalem, Israel
Therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary study of the role of law
as a therapeutic agent. This analysis of the law proposes that legal rules, legal
procedures and the roles of legal actors, including lawyers, judges and law
enforcement agents, are social forces that often have a therapeutic or
antitherapeutic effect on the individuals and ultimately the society they
govern. Although, historically, the study of law has focused on rules of law,
the rights of individuals and legal entities, and the consequences for violations
of such rules and the infringement of such rights, this discipline challenges us
to examine the interplay between such legal forces in an entirely different
light
The objective of therapeutic jurisprudence is that we increase our
sensitivity to the therapeutic or antitherapeutic effects of our legal system and
ask whether the law's antitherapeutic consequences can be reduced and its
therapeutic consequences enhanced while upholding the integrity of due
process and other values of justice that have evolved over the past centuries.
Further, in addition to taking a somewhat retrospective look and analyzing the
law that has already evolved, therapeutic jurisprudence proposes that we
explore ways in which the knowledge, theories and insights of mental health
and its related disciplines can help shape the future development of the law.
The authors are veritable pioneers in this remarkably new discipline. As
stated in one of the book's articles (Ch. 28 by Finkelman and Grisso),
therapeutic jurisprudence was first introduced by Wexler in a paper submitted
in 1987 for a workshop sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health.
By 1991, two edited volumes on the topic, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The
Law as a Therapeutic Agent (David B. Wexler ed. 1990) and Essays in
Therapeutic Jurisprudence 9 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds. 1991)
were published. Since then, therapeutic jurisprudence has influenced the
thinking of an increasing number of scholars in both the legal and mental
health fields.

Although one may logically surmise that therapeutic jurisprudence applies

